

The Real Estate

OCTOBER 1945

Roy Wenzlick Editor

A concise easily digested periodic analysis based upon scientific research in real estate fundamentals and trends... Constantly measuring and reporting the basic economic factors responsible for changes in trends and values.....Current Studies.... Surveys....Forecasts

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VOLUME XIV

RECONVERSION IS WELL UNDER WAY

PPARENTLY reconversion of industry is going to have comparatively little effect on real estate in most cities. This is shown by the fact that large decreases from the peak in manufacturing employment in many war centers have not succeeded in producing any noticeable residential vacancy. In practically all cities the housing situation is as tight or tighter than it was before V-E Day, although in some of these cities - Oakland, California, for example - manufacturing employment at the end of June was 55 per cent below the peak. This was 36 per cent above the 1937 level, as Oakland had been a rapidly growing city long before the war and will undoubtedly come out of the war period with a very much larger population than it formerly had.

The charts on pages 294 through 297 show indexes of production worker employment in manufacturing industries for principal metropolitan areas and cities from 1937 through June 1945. The red line on each chart represents the average (median) of all districts. This line reached its peak in December 1943, when it was 74 per cent above the 1937 level. By June of 1945 it had dropped, but was still 43 per cent above the base year. No figures by cities are available as yet past June, but on a national basis manufacturing employment declined 3.3 per cent further during July. August, September and October have shown further drops, but no measured figures are yet available to show how great they have been.

Twenty-three cities or areas have experienced drops of 30 per cent or more from their peaks of manufacturing employment. These are listed below.

i	% drop From peak	% above or below 1937		% drop from peak	% above or below 1937
Salt Lake City	66	- 16	Los Angeles	36	+121
Oakland	55	+ 36	Utica	35	- 3
San Diego	55	+210	Evansville	34	+105
Fort Worth	47	+140	Tampa	34	+ 84
Jacksonville	47	+ 70	Dallas	33	+121
Kansas City, Kans		+ 86	New Orleans	33	+101
Long Beach	42	+485	Fall River	32	- 23
Denver	41	- 72	Wichita	32	+516
Grand Rapids	40	- 16	Buffalo	31	+ 30
Tulsa	39	+233	Norfolk	31	+144
Miami	38	+ 69	Hartford	30	+ 30
Somerville	38	- 31			
		(continued or	nage 203)		


NET POPULATION MOVEMENTS BETWEEN FARMS AND CITIES

THE chart above shows the net movement of population in the United States from farms to cities for each year from 1920 through 1944. By net movement we mean the difference between the number of people moving from farms to cities and the number moving from cities to farms.

It will be noticed that the trend away from farms was interrupted in only one year, 1932. The Government's back-to-the-farm movement, officially started in 1933, was followed by considerable increases in the number of people moving away from farms.

The figures charted represent only changes through civilian migration. If losses to the armed forces are added to the peak of 1,920,000 in 1942, the total loss in farm population for that year is 2,779,000. Net losses due to inductions were 211,000 in 1941, 859,000 in 1942, 505,000 in 1943, and 200,000 in 1944.

The decreasing rate of civilian movement from farms is probably due partly to the very heavy migration which occurred in the early years of the war. It is quite probable that the farm population during 1945 will not show any further decreases. According to estimates of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, there were 25,190,000 persons living on farms on January 1, 1945. This is the lowest number of farm residents for the entire period of 35 years for which such estimates are available.



APARTMENT BONDS RISING RAPIDLY

The index on Apartment Bond Prices, given in table form and charted below, attempts to measure prices since 1931. It was found impossible to carry the index back further as in most cases, prior to 1931, the market for real estate bonds was artificially supported by the underwriting house regardless of the condition of the individual property. The declines in all issues came at the time when the underwriters stopped supporting the market.


The 25 issues selected for this index cover properties in 14 cities. These particular issues were selected because they are sufficiently active to secure regular quotations. Issues with complicated reorganization plans have been avoided.


Apartment bonds have increased by 59 per cent since the war started in Europe. During the past year they have increased 15.2 per cent. They are now 270 per cent above the low of 1933.

These rises in apartment bond prices have been made in spite of rent control. In a free market the rise would have been much greater.

INDEX OF APARTMENT BOND PRICES

													-		
	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
1	72.0	28.0	19.8	23.1	31.7	41.4	47.8	40.2	40.2	40.6	39.8	41.5	42.5	51.9	59.6
	69.1	26.3	18.6	24.0	32.7	42.6	47.8	40.2	40.2	41.0	39.8	41.5	43.1	53.0	60.8
3	66.3	26.8	18.0	26.1	33.7	43.0	47.8	39.4	40.2	41.0	40.0	41.5	43.6	53.5	62.0
4	63.6	24.7	17.6	26.9	35.0	43.4	47.8	39.4	40.2	41.0	40.8	41.5	44.9	54.0	62.0
5	59.2	22.2	18.0	28.2	36.8	43.8	47.8	39.4	40.2	39.4	40.8	41.5	46.2	54.0	62.6
6	54.4	20.0	19.6	29.0	38.7	43.8	46.9	39.4	41.0	37.6	41.2	41.5	46.2	55.1	62.6
7	50.1	20.0	20.0	29.0	39.5	44.2	46.9	39.4	41.0	38.2	41.2	41.5	47.4	56.3	64.5
8	45.6	20.6	20.2	29.0	40.6	44.6	46.4	39.4	41.0	39.8	41.4	41.5	48.4	56.3	64.5
9	41.5	22.0	20.8	29.0	41.0	45.5	44.5	39.4	41.4	39.8	41.4	41.5	48.4	56.5	65.1
10	36.5	22.0	20.8	29.3	41.0	46.4	43.2	40.2	41.0	39.8	41.4	41.7	50.4	56.8	
11	32.1	21.7	21.6	29.9	41.0	46.4	40.6	40.6	41.0	39.8	41.8	42.5	50.9	56.8	
12	29.2	20.8	22.0	31.4	41.4	47.3	40.6	40.2	41.0	39.8	40.5	42.5	50.9	58.5	





ket price of all open-market sales of real estate time of the sale. During this period the assessed value at the time of the sale. During this period the assessed values have dropped on many properties. This means that the drop in market price in relationship to assessed value from 1935 to 1943 was not so great as the actual drop in market prices.

In the spring of 1935 the market price of typical properties being sold in Manhattan averaged 91% of assessed values. By January 1943 a typical prop-

erty was bringing 61.8% of its assessed value.

Since January 1943 there has been a marked improvement in Manhattan real estate. With comparatively few reversals the trend has been consistently up. This is the result of the housing shortage plus the fear of inflation.

Whether the trend will continue upward when the war shipments of men and materials through the New York gateway diminish is still a debatable point which cannot be clearly predicted at present.

(continued from page 289)

Most of these cities, it will be noticed, still show manufacturing employment well above the base year of 1937. Following is a list of all cities with current figures below this level.

Percentage decrease in manufacturing employment in comparison with the levels of 1937

Reading	37	Atlanta	10
Somerville	31	Gary	8
Fall River	23	Youngstown	8
New Bedford	20	Yonkers	7
Grand Rapids	16	Providence	5
Salt Lake City	16	Utica	3
Lowell	14	Cambridge	1


Of all cities covered by these figures Wichita was still showing the largest percentage above 1937 levels as in June manufacturing employment in Wichita was still 516 per cent above the 1937 average. Undoubtedly manufacturing employment has dropped sharply since then but, in our opinion, Wichita is going to come through the postwar period with a far larger population than it had before.

In discussing reconversion unemployment it is always well to keep in mind that in the average city before the war only from one-fifth to one-half of the employment was manufacturing employment. On the other hand, manufacturing employment is the most vulnerable of all types during the reconversion period, but as it shrinks in many cities nonmanufacturing employment will increase sharply, taking up a lot of the slack.

The fact that in fourteen cities manufacturing employment is running below the levels of 1937 would indicate that at the time these figures were available conversion had not yet gotten well under way and that the manufacture of civilian goods formerly manufactured in these cities was still in the future.


The indexes of employment by States presented on pages 298 through 300 (see page 301 for the chart on the District of Columbia) are based on estimates of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We have made August 1939 the base period on these charts in order to measure the changes in employment since the start of the war in Europe.

The figures include employees in nonagricultural establishments only. They do not include self-employed persons, proprietors of unincorporated businesses, unpaid family workers, domestic help, and vessel employees. Also ex-




cluded are public emergency employees (WPA, CCC, and NYA) and persons in the armed forces.


Figures for the entire United States are shown by the red line on each chart. (continued on page 301)



FLU



LUCTUATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING BALTIMORE, MD BIRMINGHAM, ALA. BOSTON, MASS. BRIDGEPORT, CONN. BUFFALO, N.Y. 1000



80

60

1937 '38 '39 '40 '41 '42 '43 '44 1945

38 '39 '40 '41 '42 '43 '44 1945

80

1937 '38 '39 '40 '41 '42 '43 '44 1945

URING INDUSTRIES IN 93 METROPOLITAN AREA CAMBRIDGE, MASS. CAMDEN, N.J. CANTON, OHIO CHATTANOOGA, TENN NATIONAL AVERAGE FORT WO EVANSVILLE, IND FALL RIVER, MASS. FORT WAYNE, IND. FLINT, MICH NATIONAL AVERAGE 0 '41 '42 '43 '44 1945 1937 '36 '39 '40 MILWAUKEE, WIS MINNEAPOLIS -NEW BEDI IS. TENN. MIAMI, FLA NASHVILLE, TENN. ST. PAUL MINN MAS: NATIONAL AVERAGE 0 '41 '42 '43 '44 1945 ENCE.R.I. ROCHESTER, N.Y. SAINT PA READING, PA RICHMOND, VA SAINT LOUIS, MO NATIONAL AVERAGE O, OHIO UTICA, N.Y. WASHINGTON, D.C. WICHITA TRENTON, N. J. TULSA, OKLA

1937 '38 '39 '40 '41

'42 '43


AVERAGE

174.


NATIONAL AL

1937 '38 '39 '40

REAS




ESTIMATED NUMBER



OF EMPLOYEES IN NONAGRICULTURAL

WENZLICK & CO CONNECTICUT COLORADO DELAWARE FLORIDA 100 **MASSACHUSETTS** MAINE MARYLAND MICHIGAN 200 NEW MEXICO NEW YORK N. CAROLINA N. DAKOTA 100 VERMONT VIRGINIA TEXAS UTAH 120 100

ESTABLISHMENTS



(continued from page 293)

From the State figures it is not surprising to notice that the largest percentage of increase in employees in nonagricultural establishments since the beginning of the war occurred in the District of Columbia, but this peak was reached in December 1942 at a level 58 per cent above the prewar average. By July of 1945, the last month for which figures are available, this had declined by 9 per cent to a level 43.8 per cent above the August 1939 level. It is sincerely hoped that employment in Washington, D. C., will shrink much further during the next year. While it was inevitable that a large wartime population must be concentrated in the bureaus in Washington, the war is now over, the emergency is past, and bureau demobilization should be completed as rapidly as possible.

Rather peculiarly, the State of Washington followed close behind Washington, D. C., in the increase of nonagricultural employment during the war. In that State in September 1943 employment reached a level 57 per cent above the August 1939 level. The last figures available indicate that employment had declined to a level 43.4 per cent above the prewar figure.


New Hampshire has the poorest record for employment of any State of the Union for the period from 1943 on, as during this entire period it has been below the prewar level, sinking rapidly during 1943 and 1944. The current employment figure is 10 per cent below the prewar level.


Montana was only slightly better, with levels below prewar during all of 1943 and 1944 and with extremely low levels in the early part of 1945. South Dakota was a little better but still below August 1939, while North Dakota has for the most part fluctuated around the prewar level, with a very slight upward drift.


It was to be expected, of course, that employment would increase greatly,

as it did, in Michigan, Connecticut, and Ohio, all of them strong manufacturing centers, but some of the greatest increases have come in States in which nonagricultural employment in the past has not been great. These would include States such as Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.

California has, of course, shown a large increase (at the peak in August 1943 employment was 52 per cent above the prewar base), but this was to be expected as both Los Angeles and San Francisco have long been manufacturing centers, and to these during the war period has been added the tremendous volume of employment in San Diego.







	EST	IMATED NUME	BER OF NEW	NONFARM DV	VELLING UNI	TS	
	25,7		2 1121				
1920 2	47,000	1925 9	37,000	1930	330,000	1935	221,000
	49,000	1926 8	349,000	1931	254,000	1936	319,000
	16,000		310,000	1932		1937	336,000
	71,000		753,000	1933	93,000	1938	
	93,000	-	509,000	1934			515,000
2,2 0	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	-)-)	,-,,	-)3. •••		-) 5) • • • •	J-J,
			MONTHLY	FIGURES			
	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
January	32,300	25,700	41,200	34,500	45,000	17,300	7,400
February	30,700	36,900	43,700	51,300	40,100	13,500	8,500
March	42,900	46,000	60,200	52,700	33,000	18,100	13,500
April	42,900	62,900	75,200	59,700	26,700	14,300	19,000
May	53,300	57,000	70,700	60,600	33,600	16,500	19,900
June	45,900	44,100	77,200	46,300	21,800	17,500	20,400
July	44,200	57,600	74,600	26,700	24,200	14,500	23,300
August	51,200	55,800	69,800	27,500	27,600	12,800	20,100
September	42,400	58,400	67,000	40,400	24,300	11,300	22,000
October	42,900	66,200	56,200	32,200	28,100	10,800	22,000
November	45,100	44,900	46,600	30,400	26,100	11,600	
December	41,200	47,000	32,800	34,300	19,500	10,800	
Decemper.	41,200	47,000	32,000	34,300	19,500	10,000	
			CUMULATIVE	E FIGURES			
January	32,300	25,700	41,200	34,500	45,000	17,300	7,400
February	63,000	62,600	84,900	85,800	85,100	30,800	15,900
March	105,900	108,600	145,100	138,500	118,100	48,900	29,400
April	148,800	171,500	220,300	198,200	144,800	63,200	48,400
May	202,100	228,500	291,000	258,800	178,400	79,700	68,300
June	248,000	272,600	368,200	305,100	200,200	97,200	88,700
July	292,200	330,200	442,800	331,800	224,400	111,700	112,000
August	343,400	386,000	512,600	359,300	252,000	124,500	132,100
September	385,800	444,400	579,600	399,700	276,300	135,800	154,100
October	428,700	510,600	635,800	431,900	304,400	146,600	-5.,
November	473,800	555,500	682,400	462,300	330,500	158,200	
December	515,000	602,500	715,200	496,600	350,000	169,000	
				,	33.,	,	
		1:	2-MONTH MO	VING TOTAL	S		
January		508,400	618,000	708,500	507,100	322,300	159,100
February		514,600	624,800	716,100	495,900	295,700	154,100
March		517,700	639,000	708,600	476,200	280,800	149,500
April		537,700	651,300	693,100	443,200	268,400	154,200
May		541,400	665,000	683,000	416,200	251,300	157,600
June		539,600	698,100	652,100	391,700	247,000	160,500
July		553,000	715,100	604,200	389,200	237,300	169,300
August		557,600	729,100	561,900	389,300	222,500	176,600
September		573,600	737,700	535,300	373,200	209,500	187,300
October		596,900	727,700	511,300	369,100	192,200	
November		596,700	729,400	495,100	364,800	177,700	
December	515,000	602,500	715,200	496,600	350,000	169,000	
				-	0,000		



VOLUME XIV

EXECUTIVE DIGEST

OCTOBER 1945

OF THE CURRENT REAL ESTATE ANALYST REPORTS

ROY WENZLICK & CO.

Real Estate Economists, Appraisers and Counselors

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Roy Wenzlick

The rescinding of L-41 will not start a building boom. Ninety-five per cent of the cities of the United States have acute housing shortages and thousands of buyers would readily purchase new buildings if they could be provided. Builders are eager to start building but some building materials are still scarce, all building materials are high, and skilled labor is very hard to get, inefficient and non-cooperative. Housing which goes forward will be high priced and necessarily built with high overhead. With rents frozen in most cities at depression levels, it is far cheaper to rent than to own. While the extreme shortage has made many people willing to pay a premium for occupancy, it will be hard to start a large volume of building, with building costs so high and with the Federal government subsidizing all tenants at the expense of their landlords.


The table on building costs in this report gives a detailed picture of what has happened. From it can be determined the percentage of increase for any type of material or labor from any starting point desired.

The labor items in the recent past have increased by a far larger percentage than materials. This is typical of the increased costs coming in almost all lines of business. Organized labor is making the plea in each particular field that labor rates can be increased by a large percentage, with a relatively slight increase in the cost of the final product. This is true only if wage increases are restricted to the particular business in question.

Over the long period practically all costs are labor costs. The cost of building materials is the cost of extracting the basic materials, of fabricating and transporting the product and of selling it to the ultimate consumer. Even items which seem to be entirely overhead, in their last analysis are largely labor costs, such as the depreciation on equipment used in bringing the raw materials to their final state and place. It is true that the labor which created the buildings and machines is past labor and, therefore, was labor at a lower rate, but this is purely a temporary situation as these machines and buildings must eventually be replaced with machines and buildings constructed at the higher rates.

For a short while the contention of the unions is correct, that a large percentage of increase in labor rates brings a smaller percentage in the end product price, but over a period of time the only way that labor rates can be increased without increasing the price of the product is for the efficiency of operation to increase. Special studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that wages have increased far more than efficiency during the war period.

Building volume will be greater next year than this year, but building generally will get away to a rather slow start.



BUILDING COSTS OF A STANDARD SIX ROOM FRAME RESIDENCE BUILT IN SAINT LOUIS

Costs are grouped into four classifications of material, four of labor and three of overhead. A further breakdown of these groups is given in detail below. Columns of the table are numbered, and a brief description of the items included in each is given in the paragraphs below. Paragraphs are numbered to correspond with the columns described. Building material costs are indicated by the letter M; corresponding labor items, in red by the letter L.

*No labor items are shown in Column 10, Building Hardware, as they have already been included in Column 5, Millwork.

- Group A

 (1) Masonry: Cement, sand, gravel, quick lime, hydrated lime, hard wall plaster, face and common brick, fire brick, flue lining.
 (2) Tile Work: 4 k x 4 k wall tile, ceramic floor tile, cap and base.

- (2) Tile WOFK: To A To Mark And Andrews (2) Tile WOFK: To And Calling Joists, interior and exterior studis, rafters, bracing, etc.
 (%) Finished Lumber: Sub-flooring, sheathing, beveled siding, finished floors, asphalt shingle roofing, roofing felt, tar paper, shutters, etc.
 (5) Millwork: Windows, doors, trim, kitchen cabinet, stairs.

Group C
(6) Heating: Boiler, insulating jackets, fittings, tools, pipes, con-

nections, valves and radiation.

(7) Plumbing: Soil pipes and connections, stack, water pipe and connections, lead oakum and bathroom fixtures; hot water heater and tank to be furnished by others.

Group D

- (8) Sheet Metal: Galv. iron (present) gutters, downspouts, flashing.
 (9) Electrical Work: Main switch, EX cable, switch boxes, receptacles, transformer, etc. No fixtures included.
 (10) Mails and Hardware: Common and wire nails, bolts, damper, ash doors,

- (10) Mails and Mardware: Common and wire nails, boits, damper, ash definish hardware.

 (11) Fainting: White lead, linseed oil, turpentine.

 (12) Miscellaneous: Metal and wood laths, corner bead, insulation.

 Total Material and Labor Costs

- Oroup E

 (13) Overhead and profit of subcontractors in plastering, metal work, heating, plumbing, electrical work and tile work.
- neating, plumbing, electrical work and tile work.

 (14) Beneral contractories profit.

 (15) Missouri sales tax (now 2% on materials), old age and unemployment tax (federal and state), ilability and employees' compensation insurance, fire and tornado insurance, completion bond.

 (16) Total overhead, profit and other costs.

 TOTAL CONSTRUCTION COST

1		GRO	UP A				GROL	P B				GRO	UP (-			C	ROL	JP I	D		-				GRO	UP E	:	TOTAL
YEAR	()	.)	(5)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)			1)	(12)	Tot	A.	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	
1015	M	L	**	1.		L *101		L		L .		L 4126		110		L					L	H	- 11	# \$1973	L	Ant S	A227	1120		\$3836
1914 1915 1916 1917	362	388 388		13 13 13	212 189 224	101 108 108	415 373 438 500	134 145 145	349 329 363	121	147 152 203	136 144 144	248 249 309		59 68 101	12	32 38 55	52 52	59 64 86	16 17 22	64 69 69 69	50 48 59	18	1973 1911 2250	1146	248		132 135 142	717 717 729 812 895	3836 3837 4267 4747
1918 1919 1920 1921 1922	539 624 742 674 609	421 453 463 501 506	25 25 28 25 25	15 17 18	292 519 607 479 362		1008 1189 920	170	729 1030	143 154 220 225 209	322 290 305 273 258	152 160 184 192 204	349 372 460	124 130 150 156 166	83 83 64	14 15 21 22 20	45 46 35	57 66 69	113 143 94	30	75 81 116 119 111	112 132 104	32	3928 4713 3664	1295 1386 1695 1773 1744	346 342 366 372 370	457 566 677 581 536	163 187 227 215 205	966 1095 1270 1168 1111	5185 6409 7678 6605 6103
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Nour opinion Congress will not enact ceiling prices on existing houses, nor on houses to be built in the near future, in spite of the pressure being exerted at the present time by Chester Bowles. Rent control will be continued by Congress after the great bulk of price controls expire in June of 1946. The best that real estate interests can hope for at that time is a percentage increase in the ceiling.

HE preliminary figure for real estate activity during the month of September showed it to be 52.5 per cent above the long-term computed normal. The highest point reached was in July of this year at 55.6 per cent above normal. The September figures since 1942 on real estate activity have been as follows:

	% Above		% Above
Year	Normal	Year	Normal
1942	5.7	1944	44.2
1943	24.4	1945	52.5

The principal factor limiting real estate sales at the present time is the six-month limitation on eviction of a tenant. Had residential rents been frozen at a higher level, this limitation on evictions would not work as great a hardship on the owners of real estate as it does at the levels selected by the OPA.

ORTGAGE activity in September was 22 per cent below the long-term computed normal, but this is the highest September since the depression. Septembers of previous years were as follows:

	% Below		% Below
Year	Normal	Year	Normal
1942	38.3	1944	25.8
1943	39.2	1945	22.0

THE preliminary figure for the foreclosure rate in September was 4.0 foreclosures per hundred thousand families in all urban places. In 1933 foreclosures rose to 84.4 on a comparative basis. The comparative figures for September in past years were:

1942	10.0	1944	4.6
1943	6.4	1945	4.0

No collapse in real estate values has ever occurred without a rise in foreclosures consistently increasing month after month as the drop occurs. The foreclosure index is still quite encouraging.

Business activity is dropping rapidly due to the combination of cancellation of government contracts, frictional unemployment during reconversion, and labor tieups. All of these causes are relatively temporary, in our opinion, with the outlook for a fairly satisfactory year in 1946.

HE stock market has risen very sharply during the recent past, with the increasing chance of a readjustment, as the market generally rises in a saw-tooth fashion. The outlook over the longer period, however, still seems in favor of higher prices for common stocks. The period of the next few months, however, is quite clouded.



y see

"HOT MONEY"

I VEN if the Federal government really wanted to prevent further inflation. there is some question whether any plan which it might attempt would be For the past thirteen years we have operated on unbalanced ✓ successful. budgets and during this period every encouragement has been given to the factors which increase the cost of production. First, during the depression period an attempt was made to limit the use of labor-saving machinery and to restrict output. At the same time farmers were given a subsidy to limit their production, thereby increasing the cost of food to the balance of the population, both through its direct cost and through the added tax burden.

Budgets were necessarily badly unbalanced during the war period and during this period most manufacturers were operating on a modified cost-plus ba-Production was badly needed and had to be secured at any cost. Inefficiency was rife and unit costs rose considerably during the war period, in spite of large volume with practically no sales expense. This is clearly shown in the studies of the Bureau of Labor Statistics quoted on page 191 of the July 1945 Real Estate Analyst.

In any free economy the law of supply and demand determines prices. This economic principle is given lip service by many people who do not understand its implications. They are quite surprised to learn that building material prices have often risen sharply in the United States at a time when practically no new building was being done, and the same thing would be true of almost any other item. It is not only the demand for and supply of a specific commodity which determines its price, but since prices are expressed in dollars a rise in the price of building materials may be due to a fall in the price of dollars, and this fall in the price of dollars may be due to the fact that more dollars had been created than the use for money at that time required. The rise in building material prices during the early Civil War period is a good example of this condition. The Civil War was financed by printing Greenbacks and, in spite of the fact that new building practically ceased, building materials rose rapidly in dollars because dollars were decreasing rapidly in value.

Another factor enters into price level determinations and that is the rate at which currency and credit is used. A checking account with an average balance of one thousand dollars may do ten thousand dollars worth of money work in a month, provided that deposits are made daily to offset checks which are drawn daily. On the other hand, an inactive account of one thousand dollars may not do any money work during the month. If the turnover of currency and credit is high, the same amount of money and credit will do the money work

of a much larger amount and will have the same effect that an increase in the amount of currency would have. An increase in the rate of turnover of currency and credit will result in a higher price level and a drop in the rate of turnover will result in a lower price level.

If the government wanted to make a sincere effort to control inflation in the period ahead, it would be necessary for it to do the following things:

- 1. To secure the greatest production possible of all types of commodities and services. The maximum production cannot be secured under the present policies of the OPA. There are some low cost producers in each field who could probably operate at the present time within the price ceiling set by the OPA, pay the high costs which have resulted from government policies, and still make a large enough profit to prove the necessary incentive for full production. In every field, however, producers will vary greatly in their efficiency and in the immediate future we need the mass output not only of the lowest cost producers but also of those whose cost of production is higher. These higher cost producers cannot produce under the present conditions and the resulting scarcity is creating more pressure and higher prices than would result if official prices were allowed to rise slightly, bringing additional units into production.
- 2. To retard inflation at a time when insufficient goods and services are available, demand should be restricted; however, our politically minded legislators and officials are reducing taxes and, therefore, increasing spending power at a time when goods and services are not available for the spending power thus released. The present legislation in Congress by reducing Federal taxes by approximately six billion dollars for 1946 will add six billion dollars to the amount which can be spent. The lone Congressman who bitterly opposed reducing taxes at the present time in the committee hearings took the correct, but extremely unpopular, stand.
- 3. The demand for money and credit should be increased as an inflation control. The present deterrent to this increased demand during the past few years has been the artificially low rate of interest and return brought about by government manipulations in the market. In order to make government bonds attractive and to finance our deficits at the lowest carrying cost, the rate of return on capital has been pushed so low that individuals and corporations have not found it profitable to borrow. The man who is willing to furnish risk capital finds the cards so stacked against him that he is not willing to finance new industries which, in the last analysis, must be depended upon to increase the volume of employment.

At the same time that the commercial demand for money and credit was low, the supply of money and credit has been greatly augmented until today the currency in circulation per capita is more than three times the amount in circulation at the beginning of the war and currency and credit combined on a per capita basis considerably more than doubles the prewar level.

This situation is getting worse rather than better. We are continuing to operate on a deficit basis and it looks as if we will continue with an unbalanced budget for a great many years in the future. The tax reductions now being negotiated by Congress at the same time that many expensive projects are being considered at government expense will insure a continued increase in the

volume of currency and credit per capita.

So long as the war continued, patriotic motives secured a high degree of compliance with government price regulations, but black markets will be much harder to control in the period ahead than they have been in the past. The lack of merchandise during the war with much of the available goods rationed, substituted ration points for currency and held in check the use of a large part of our surplus funds. These funds can no longer be held in check, with the probability that the rate of turnover of currency and credit will increase.

Let us look in detail at the policies now being followed in contrast with the policies which have just been enumerated which should be followed if inflation is to be controlled.

- 1. Reconversion is being hampered on every side by labor difficulties, with governmental blessing, and at the same time industry is told that it must pay higher wages but that prices cannot be increased. The President himself in his radio address has encouraged labor to seek additional increases. This will slow down the rate at which quantity production comes on to the market, and, accordingly, will increase the inflation pressure.
- 2. During the reconversion period while goods and services are not available, demand should be restricted in every way possible. In place of following such a policy, however, the government is releasing purchasing power by reducing taxes at a time when goods and services are not available for purchase.
- 3. A large part of the cost of the war has been financed on a very short-term basis and during the next few years a tremendous amount of refinancing on our war debt will be necessary. During this period it will no longer be possible to sell war or victory bonds to the general public in high pressure drives. It will be necessary to secure the larger part of the funds necessary for refinancing by selling bonds to the banks. This is an indirect way of creating dollars, as effective as the printing of Greenbacks but much more dangerous, as it does not cause the same degree of alarm on the part of the general public. The end result, however, is probably more inflationary than the printing of that much money.

I have been convinced during the period since V-J Day that both Congress and the President will follow the easy path which leads to further inflation rather than risk the displeasure of voters who in the great majority of cases are economic illiterates. If I am right, construction costs will continue to rise above their present high level and if this occurs the high prices for which existing housing has been sold may not seem high in retrospect five years from now.

In several bulletins recently I have advised liquidating on the present market single-family residences which are selling above their replacement cost and particularly buildings not too desirably located and not too modern. I still think this is wise, although if inflation should run wild in the United States it would be far better to continue to hold tangible properties, both urban and rural, than to attempt to get out of the market at what appeared to be a high level.

On well located, well designed properties there probably will not be a great risk in holding for another year or two with the chance that by that time the eventual degree of inflation can be estimated more accurately and a more definite policy can be outlined.

BOY WENZLICK